Rationality in Drama & Fiction.
ABSTRACTS
{in order of appearance}
Steven Brams, Anger
in Fiction: Springboard to Reconciliation or Tragedy?
I develop game theory models, based on the theory of moves, that show why
a character, out of frustration, may find it rational to depart from a Nash-equilibrium
outcome in a game. The resulting anger that this character expresses, and
the crisis that ensues, may end in either reconciliation (illustrated by Aristophanes'
Lysistrata) or tragedy (illustrated by Shakespeare's Macbeth). Or it may result
in endless cycling, with no resolution (illustrated by Joseph Heller's Catch-22).
Paisley Livingston, Hot
and Cold Irrationality in the Films of Ingmar Bergman
In its overarching emphasis on motivated irrationality, the art film
in the modernist tradition would appear to be out of step with the emphasis
on cold bias and error within contemporary psychological research.
The work of Ingmar Bergman is a rather notorious case in point. His characterizations
and plots seem to focus entirely on hot forms of irrationality, the main thought
being that it is primarily desires, moods, and emotions that precipitate catastrophic
errors and conflicts. In this regard Bergman may have been influenced by Eino
Kaila, a Finnish philosopher whose 1934 treatise in philosophical psychology
is a veritable catalogue of the forms of motivated irrationality.
In this talk I will explore what I take to be
some of the more insightful fictional depictions of irrationality to be found
in the films of Ingmar Bergman. I will also discuss the basis and significance
of the apparent overemphasis on hot as opposed to cold irrationality. Is there
something about cinematic story-telling that makes the (modernist) fiction
film an inefficient vehicle for certain psychological findings? Or is there
in fact a due attention given to the species of irrationality? How and why
are spectators of these films led to make attributions of irrationality to
fictional characters? And what, if anything, can we learn about irrationality
and rationality from such fictions?
Marion Ledwig, Rational
Emotional Responses to Art
In order to evaluate whether it is rational to
respond emotionally to art, it is first necessary to agree upon what art is.
Originality is the central feature of art, with the different subject matters
or materials used to determine which form in particular that work of art takes.
The paradox of fiction is solved by claiming that people have beliefs in the
existence and features of objects, even if known to be completely fictional,
for seeing means believing. An emotional response to art is rational, if the
agent has good reasons for his emotional response with regard to the particular
piece of art. Hence, many different emotional responses to art become rational.
Keith Oatley, Characters
in Dialogue and Literary Emotions: Routes to Rationality in Julius Caesar
and The Seagull
Depictions of character that go beyond the necessities
of a plot enable an approach to rationality that can be thought of in terms
of Aristotelian dialectic. Here, as Bakhtin has discussed, audience members
can take part empathetically with characters in mental dialogues that enable
rational participation in the vicissitudes and dilemmas in a play or novel.
For emotions, an important source is Indian poetics, in which are described
rasas: aesthetic or literary emotions, which are experienced by audience members.
Each rasa is related to an everyday emotion (love, anger, fear, etc.) but
each is more rational because it can be less caught up in the egoism that
can blind us to significance in its everyday counterpart. The active principle
in Indian poetics is dhvani, or suggestiveness: so within a frame summoned
by any one rasa (think genre, such as love story, revenge story, thriller,
etc.) the function of words of a writer and actions of an actor is to suggest
moods and understandings within a rational social structure. These processes
are illustrated by discussion of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and Chekhov's
The Seagull.
Stephen Rowland, Rationality
and the Young Child
This paper draws upon my research conducted 25 years ago in UK into the intellectual
life of a group of nine year old children in a primary school classroom. At
that time, primary education was much less constrained by government requirements
and targets, and I was fortunate enough to identify a school which valued
open forms of enquiry amongst the children. Working alongside a classroom
teacher I would at times join in activities which the children had devised
for themselves, or observe them pursuing the suggestions of their teacher,
or offer them my own ideas to consider.
This context provided privileged access to the
childrens thinking over a year. I had considerable experience as a primary
school teacher, but during this study I also worked like an ethnologist observing
and playing a part with those I observed. I kept detailed field notes recording
their activities, conversations, stories, paintings and so forth. These field
notes enabled an appreciation of their work and the quality of their thinking.
Analysis was qualitative and hermeneutic in style.
Underlying this approach was an assumption that
young childrens activity is best interpreted if we assume them to act
rationally. This assumption served two purposes: it was effective pedagogically
in that when children are responded to as if they were rational, then this
tends to enhance their reasoning capabilities; and it was effective methodologically
as a research stance, in that it enabled plausible explanations of the decisions
they made. This approach will be illustrated
through a close account of three children discussing the existence of God,
recorded in my field notes.
Changes in primary school education policy over
the last 20 years which have resulted in a more centralized and prescribed
curriculum - have made it difficult to envisage this kind of enquiry and approach
to the analysis of childrens thinking.
Jenny Davidson, Emma's
Choices
A consideration of how Austen presents decision-making
and concealment in a novel that foregrounds questions of knowledge and information.
Bertram Schefold, The
Good Life, the Theory and the Reality of Capitalism: Economists in the Circle
Around the German Poet Stefan George
Stefan George was the first modern poet in Germany; he adopted symbolism in
Paris from Mallarmé and transformed the poetic language by writing
full-sounding verses; a form of German lyric resulted which was stronger in
form than what was known among the epigones of Goethe. He founded a journal
and created a circle of friends to whom beauty seemed important. They reacted
to the Bourgois character and the power policy of imperial Germany. At the
same time they were proud of the German cultural heritage which they hoped
to renew. The Circle attracted, apart from a number of other important personalities
(poets, artists and scholars in various fields of the humanities), also some
economists later of renown. They were thus confronted with the problem of
how to reconcile the ideals of a good life, based on aesthetic principles,
with the necessity to confront the economic, social and political problems
of the day, torn between the influences of German conservatism, Marxism and
new currents such as Max Weber's sociology. Some of these economists would
keep their artistic and professional lives strictly apart. Others took up
the intellectual challenge and enriched their discipline with new departures,
especially regarding economic sociology, economic history and methodology.
Special emphasis will be given in the paper to Edgar Salin with his conception
of Anschauliche Theorie (Intuitive Theory). At the surface this was developed
out of a critique of Sombart, but it has deeper roots in ideas emanating from
the Circle.
Sarah Churchwell, Love Crazy
Steffen Huck, Why Elsa
Asks from Whence He Came: An Epistemological Analysis of Richard Wagner's
Lohengrin
Elsa knows she's innocent and so does Lohengrin. But
does Elsa know that Lohengrin knows? In this paper I analyse the belief structure
in Wagner's Lohengrin. Particular attention is paid to the trial-by-battle
scene in act one. The analysis makes use of so-called agreement theorems
developed in game theory and allows for a new and, as I argue, psychologically
more convincing explanation for why Elsa asks the forbidden question.
Ronald de Sousa, Fictional
Possibilities
No belief or decisions is rational or irrational except in the light of alternative
possibilities constituting what William James called live options.
But what counts as possible for a fictional character? Fiction, like art,
is able to depict impossibilities. But not just any impossibilities: different
genres presuppose different ranges of possible actions and outcomes. Polygamous
marriage is a live option for biblical characters, but not for the protagonists
of Jane Austen novels; by contrast, refusing to sacrifice Isaac is perhaps
not a live option for Abraham. Yet one can imagine a postmodern, satirical
or parodic bible in which Abraham makes God a counteroffer he can't refuse.
Thus different genres presuppose different ranges of possibilities, and hence
of rational action. Furthermore, the phenomenon known as imaginative
resistance appears to illustrate certain other constraints on fictional
possibilities. Does this, in turn, constrain fictional rationality? In hopes
of shedding some light on these questions, this paper will sketch two ways
of classifying different sorts of possibilities and their application to fiction.